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0. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, Flanders has increasingly relied on public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) for achieving its public services. Not only in Flanders, but also around the 
entire world PPPs became very popular in the public sector. Some even state that they 
have become an icon of modern public administration (Hodge & Greve 2009). 
Consequently, PPPs are a popular topic for public sector scholars to study (Hodge and 
Greve 2005; Pollitt 2005; Skelcher 2005). Some of the main issues in PPP-research, 
therefore, include the democratic quality of PPPs (Skelcher, De Rynck, Klijn and Voets 
2008), their policy impact (McLaughlin and Osborne 2000), and management issues 
(Klijn and Teisman 2000). Nonetheless, little systematic knowledge is available about 
the design, the control, and, particularly, the performance of PPPs3.  
To fill this gap, we have developed a conceptual framework to study these 
underexposed aspects of a PPP, in the context of a five-year research project 
sponsored by the Flemish government.  The fundamental question of the research 
project is, therefore, the following: which factors - in terms of institutional design, 
control, and government capacity – influence/have an impact on the performance of 
PPPs? 
In the paper ‘Complexity and Control: How do they work in PPPs?’4 we already focused 
on how different elements of complexity affected the control - used by the public 
partner - within a PPP. The empirical evidence was gathered by comparing two local 
cases that were similar, but still had different aspects5. The present paper builds on 
this previous work and further elaborates on two components of the conceptual 
framework: the control-mix and the level of trust within a PPP. Hence, our research 
question for this paper states:  How does trust and control interact within a PPP?  
In the first section of the paper, we briefly discuss the conceptual framework 
developed to study the aforementioned fundamental question. The framework draws 
on a range of insights in PPP-literature, combining and testing them in a novel way. 
This conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Each component of the conceptual framework is divided into a number of sub-
variables. The focus of this paper, however, is the relationship between the use of 
control (the control cycle) and the level of trust. Therefore, most of the attention in 
this section will be spent on this aspect of the framework.  
The second part of the paper discusses a case study involving the Flemish government 
with private (and other public) partners. This explorative case study is part of a wider 
set of cases currently studied in a long-term research project. The case study 
illustrates the usefulness of the conceptual framework, but also suggests some 
amendments. 
Finally, we will conclude by sharing the lessons we have learned that are useful for our 
continued research, and by formulating some hypothesises to be tested in the next set 
of case studies. 
                                                     
3 Note that if we talk about PPPs, we refer to long-term infrastructure contracts (mainly DBFM-contracts) between 
public and private actors. 
4 Van Gestel,K., Voets, J. & Verhoest,K. (2009). Complexity and control: how do they work in PPPs?" IRSPM XIII 2009. 6-
8 april 2009. Denemarken: Kopenhagen. 29 p. 
5 Two case studies concerning the DBFMO (design-build-finance-maintain and operate) of local sports infrastructure 
(swimming pools). 
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper draws on a more elaborate conceptual framework used in the long-term 
research project (see Figure 1). As the figure shows, key components are the type of 
PPP, complexity, government capacity, the control mix, trust and performance. Only 
the two boxes marked in grey are dealt with in this paper. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
PPP Performance
    * Financial added value
    * Operational added value
    * Societal added value
Complexity
- Multi-actor complexity
      (incl. relational risks)
- Technical complexity
      (incl. operational risks)
- Political complexity
      (incl. democratic risks
Transaction-
and output
oriented
control
(Market)
Process- and
trust oriented
control
(Network)
Government capacity
Macro-level
(government-wide)
Micro-level (PPP-specific)
Input- and
process
oriented
control
(Hierarchy)
Trust
Control
Character-based Competence
 
 
We assume that, during the lifecycle of a PPP, there will be an interaction between 
the use of control within the PPP and the presence or absence of trust, and vice versa. 
This interaction effect is represented by the arrow between the two boxes (trust and 
control) in grey.  
 
1.1 PPP-stages 
As PPPs are dynamic processes, interaction between the aforementioned variables is 
analysed in a dynamic way. To do so, we distinguish the different stages of a PPP. 
Based on the model developed by the centre of expertise on PPPs of the Flemish 
government (‘Vlaams Kenniscentrum PPS’), the four stages we use are (Figure 2): the 
initiation stage (similar to the exploration phase), the public structuration stage 
(similar to the planning phase), the selection stage (a separate stage in which the 
private partners need to be selected), and the implementation stage (which bundles 
the realisation and operation stage). We can cluster the four stages into two 
components for case analysis: public-public stage and public-private stage. 
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Figure 2: PPP-stages 
Initiation
Public-Public
Structuring
Selection Execution
Public-public stage
Public-private stage
 
 (www.vlaanderen.be/pps) 
 
1.1.1 Public-public stage  
In the first component of this dichotomy, only public parties are present. Therefore, 
we will refer to it as the ‘public-public stage’. 
The first phase is the initiation stage. Regardless of the purpose, forming a PPP 
involves considerable investments by all parties. The main incentive for governments 
to engage in a PPP is the pre-financing and possible lower costs of infrastructure 
projects. This is also one of the main critiques of the recent PPP-revival: it has only 
provided the government with a mega-credit card (Hodge and Greve 2007).  
The initiation stage is, therefore, mainly concerned with the exploration of the 
possibilities of setting up a PPP to achieve public goals. The conclusion of this stage is 
the decision of the public party or parties whether or not to act as a ‘triggering’ entity 
(Doz et al. 2000) for the formation of a PPP.  
The next stage is a stage of project structuring between all public parties involved, 
referred to as the public-public structuring phase. All implicated public parties are 
included in discussions about the project. The end of this stage is a shared view on 
needs and aims of the project, detailed in a plan of action, i.e. a project report.  
 
1.1.3 Public-private stage  
The second component is characterised by the presence of (a) private partner(s), in 
this paper referred to as the public-private period.  
The first phase is called the selection phase. The ‘triggering’ public actor should make 
the procurement procedure public, which includes stating the selection procedure 
publicly so it is open to every private party that wants to participate in the 
partnership. Depending on the procedure, there is more room for real negotiations and 
commitments between all public parties.   
The second phase, referred to as the execution phase, involves the actual practice and 
management of the chosen form of public-private partnership in conjunction with the 
actual realisation of the project. 
In this paper, we focus on PPPs involving infrastructure development (as they are the 
most common type, see Eggers and Startup 2005). This means that the execution or 
implementation phase can be divided into two different sub-stages. The first sub-
phase refers to the construction of the infrastructure itself (i.e. the realisation stage), 
while the second sub-phase is the maintenance and/or management of the 
infrastructure (i.e. the operation stage). 
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1.2 Control 
The crux of the conceptual framework is the black box of control. Control is used here 
in its broadest sense, namely as a cycle of guidance. Control (in its strict sense) and 
evaluation (Kaufmann et al. 1986) encompass the mechanisms and instruments used by 
government to intentionally influence the decisions and the behaviour of other 
governments or private partners in order to achieve government objectives (Verhoest, 
Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers and Bouckaert 2005).  
In the context of PPPs, White (1991:189) defines control as the general mechanisms 
and more specific sets of instruments that public actors use to consciously influence 
the behaviour of other public and private actors in the PPP to achieve the public 
actors’ goals. 
The black box of control can fit into the well-known trinity of hierarchy, market, and 
networks (HMN). The distinction between hierarchies, markets, and networks as three 
fundamental mechanisms of control in social life is widely accepted in the literature 
(Thompson et al. 1991; O’Toole 1997; Kaufmann et al. 1986). A PPP can be considered 
a social system in which interdependent actors develop certain interaction and 
communication patterns -- with a certain level of endurance -- to deal with a policy 
problem or programme (Hufen and Ringeling 1990; Kickert and Van Vugt 1984). Table 1 
presents their basic features.  
 
Table 1: Basic features of hierarchy, market, and network 
 Hierarchy Market Network 
Base of interaction Authority and dominance 
Exchange and 
competition 
Cooperation and 
solidarity 
Purpose 
Consciously designed 
and controlled goals 
Spontaneously created 
results 
Consciously designed 
purposes or 
spontaneously created 
results 
Guidance, control 
and evaluation 
Top down norms and 
standards, routines, 
supervision, inspection, 
intervention 
Supply and demand, 
price mechanism, self-
interest, profit and 
losses as evaluation, 
courts, invisible hand 
Shared values, common 
problem analysis, 
consensus, loyalty, 
reciprocity, trust, 
informal evaluation - 
reputation 
Role of government 
Top-down rule-maker 
and steering, dependent 
actors are controlled by 
rules 
Creator and guardian of 
markets, purchaser of 
goods, actors are 
independent 
Network enabler, 
network manager and 
network participant 
Resources needed Authority power 
Bargaining 
Information and Power 
Mutual Cooptation 
Trust 
Theoretical basis Weberian bureaucracy 
Neo-institutional 
economics 
Network theory 
(Peters, Bouckaert and Verhoest 2010:29, based on Thompson et al. 1991, O’Toole 1997, 
Kaufmann et al. 1986, Peters 2003) 
 
In our opinion, these three mechanisms provide a useful typology to analyse 
coordination efforts within the public sector. This trinity is used in very distinct ways 
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in inter- and intra-organisational research: to study different government levels 
(Hegner 1986), to label different state models (Van Heffen and Klok 2000), to name 
different ways to operate local government (Bouckaert et al.), and to analyse inter-
organisational clusters (e.g. Osborne about bringing in third sector parties to provide 
personal social services or Lowndes and Skelcher to analyse partnerships). It is also 
used as a way to control staff departments in organisations (Vosselman 1995), to 
assess control within organisations in general (Ouchi 1980), or as a way of defining  
bureaucratic, market, and social mechanisms of control. Additionally, it might prove 
to be a powerful analytical tool that should be used to further the study of PPPs. 
These three general mechanisms can be made more concrete in the form of control 
instrument typologies. In cybernetics, the control system contains three subsystems: 
an ex ante subsystem of planning and target setting; an ex nunc and ex post 
measurement and monitoring subsystem; and an ex post subsystem of evaluation, 
audit, and feedback. We use a control instrument typology that is based on existing 
typologies (see Van der Doelen, Lindblom, Dunsire, Etzioni) and developed further by 
Verhoest (2005) and Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest (2010).  
 
1.2.1 Hierarchic control instruments 
Hierarchic control is closely related to the bureaucratic mechanism, which refers to 
the principle of the Weberian bureaucracy based on (arbitrary) rules about available 
inputs, required processes, and/or standards of results and quality.  
There are a number of typical features in a hierarchy. First of all, control is top-down. 
Actors that are being controlled are considered relatively passive objects (hence, they 
are referred to as the single actor model). Secondly, authority is the interaction 
pattern. There is a clear distinction between politics and administration. Politics can 
control and decide on the strategic goals, and it is the basis of the control 
relationship. This enables the development of bureaucratic routines. Rules and 
commands are the basis of planning in a normative power relation, whereas 
supervision is the basis of management control. In terms of sanction (positive and 
negative), rewards and punishment are used. Finally, conflicts are resolved through 
authority, which is exercised by the controlling government. 
These features can be translated into a typology of hierarchic control instruments. 
Control, focused typically on input and process, then is achieved by: 
 Restrictive rules 
 Veto power 
 Power of annulment or the competence of a higher public body to annul 
decisions made by lower public bodies  
 Ex ante rules and directions/regulations 
 Detailed procedures (e.g. detailed step-by-step plans) 
 Ex ante authorisation and approval 
 Supervision or punctual inspections of primary processes (i.e. primary 
supervision) 
 Recognition procedures 
 Direct instructions 
 Line item-budgeting, which involves a very detailed picture of expenditure 
(decreasing autonomy to allocate money differently) 
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1.2.2 Market oriented control instruments 
The general assumption of the market mechanism is that actors base their behaviour 
on the price within a competitive market. The main difference between the market 
mechanism and bureaucratic mechanism is that there are no ex ante rules set by 
higher levels that direct implementation processes through which implementation can 
be monitored. The norms are set by the market in the form of a market price 
(Vosselman 1996). 
The market mechanism is, therefore, based on a horizontal interaction relation 
between equal actors (Verhoest 2002). The control instruments used here are often 
formulated in terms of a principal-agent relationship. To reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour of the agent, the principal-agent theory points to three strategies (Verhoest 
2003). The first strategy is monitoring, which means that the principal can observe, 
monitor, and evaluate the behaviour and/or results of the agent. Monitoring thus 
reduces the information-asymmetry between principal and agent. Secondly, bonding 
implies that the principal can incorporate ex ante safeguards to prevent the agent of 
taking actions that oppose the interests of the principal. The agent can also set up an 
internal control system of its own. A third strategy involves rewards and transfer of 
(typically operational) risks. The principal builds in sanctions and rewards to stimulate 
the agent. Transfer of risks also lowers incongruence of goals. 
These features can be translated into a typology of market control instruments. 
Control, typically focused on output and transaction, then is achieved by: 
 Contractual agreements 
 Performance norms and monitoring 
 Result-oriented reporting 
 Transfer of risks 
 Performance control and audit provisions (auditing internal control) 
 Mediation and conciliation service (strong market orientation: very strict 
mediation, usually one round, followed by court)  
 Contractual monitoring moments (e.g. revision of contracts every 5 years)… 
 Secondary supervision (audit internal control mechanisms) 
 Degree of competition 
o Before the negotiation 
o During the contract (e.g. evaluating the contract each 5 years, 
continuous pressure) 
 Market-oriented financing 
o Result-oriented financing (result-bound financial incentives, e.g. 
finances dependent on visitor numbers) 
o Both result-oriented rewards and sanctions 
o Benefit sharing 
o Benchmarking (financing dependent on results in comparison to similar 
projects in the market) 
 
1.2.3 Network control instruments 
While networks have some features of the hierarchic and market mechanism, there 
are sufficient arguments to consider it a distinct mechanism (Verhoest 2002).  
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The first feature is that interactions are based on reciprocity. Trust, collaboration, 
and loyalty are key concepts in networks. Second, the network mechanism is based on 
the idea that actors are able to identify complementary interests. This leads to 
resource exchanges between actors that are based on interdependent relations, trust, 
loyalty, and reciprocity (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997). Next, the third feature is 
the equal status of the government amongst other actors in the networks. Government 
does not hold a hierarchic position vis-à-vis other actors (although government is, of 
course, a special actor because it has a monopoly over a number of resources, like the 
use of force). Therefore, policy, as the fourth feature, is developed in a network 
instead of just being implemented. Typically, policy is the outcome of the interaction 
between independent partners, which causes the distinction between policy 
development and implementation to become vague. The fifth feature is in regard to 
how the network mechanism involves a specific set of management strategies (Kickert, 
Klijn and Koppenjan 1997) in which success is not necessarily measured in terms of 
goal achievement but (also) in terms of satisfaction of participants about the process 
itself and whether joint solutions for problems can be agreed upon. In network 
control, fine-tuning and flexibility take priority over generic instruments, like 
legislation and one-size-fits-all solutions. Networks are also featured by coalitions. To 
avoid the negative impact of fragmentation and proliferation, networks are set up by 
stakeholders, customers, or based on policy cycles. Finally, conflicts are solved using 
the reputation of network members. 
These features can be translated into a typology of network control instruments. 
Control, typically focused on process and trust, then is achieved by: 
 Network management (including culture and relations) 
 Mutual control 
o Frequent (personal) contacts, extensive consultation and collaborative 
procedures 
o Control through people, based on social control, reputation, legitimacy, 
etc. 
o Advising, co-decision making 
 Horizontal control and involving stakeholders and peers in the process, like: 
o User panels 
o Users in boards  
o Visitations (e.g. to benchmark each others' control systems) 
The three-fold typology of control instruments can be used to map the extent to which 
they are present or not in a case. However, the formal presence of such instruments is 
only part of the control story. We are also interested in the actual control that takes 
shape in interactions between actors in the PPP. So, on the one hand, we use a 
typology of formal control instruments that fit one of the three control mechanisms. 
On the other hand – and this is where PPP-research often fails – is the level of the 
actual interactions between actors. The formal instruments are relevant, as they 
provide grounds for control, but their presence or absence says little about their 
actual use or relevance in concrete practices. A PPP might involve a wide set of 
control instruments that are not being used in the interaction between actors, and 
vice versa. It is the combination of the formal and factual picture that we aspire to 
develop further to enrich the PPP-research.  
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1.2.4 Formal content vs. actual behaviour of partners 
We are interested in understanding the mix of these three types of control, in terms of 
their mutual interaction, and the overall impact of the mix on performance of PPPs. 
We refer to a control mix, since the three types are ideal-types that never occur in 
their pure form (Parsons 1995). In two case studies, both involving two neighbouring 
municipalities that cooperate to construct a swimming pool infrastructure by means of 
a PPP, Van Gestel, Voets, and Verhoest (2009) found that there was a distinction 
between the formal content and presence of control instruments and the actual 
behaviour partners developed. There is a distinction between formal control and 
factual behaviour. There also is a gap between the formal control mechanisms and 
instruments stated in formal documents, contracts, and legislation, and the actual use 
of control instruments in practice. 
 
Formal control 
With formal content, or formal control, we mean the set of control and steering 
instruments that are stipulated in formal and written sources related to a specific PPP. 
In other words, these written and formal sources are the carriers of formal control 
instruments. Figure 3 illustrates for each PPP-phase what the sources or carriers of 
formal steering and control can be. 
Figure 3: Formal control carriers 
initiation public structuring selection execution
Legislation (public procurement law, administrative law,...)
public cooperation agreement
specifications
PPP-contract, shareholders
agreement , statutes,
concession,...
 
Once a new carrier of formal control instruments is constructed (i.e. a PPP-contract), 
it will not easily change over time and eventually becomes an institutional element. 
For instance, a PPP-contract is designed to last up to 30 years. But this doesn’t mean 
that during this period the contract can’t be adjusted to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  
 
Factual control 
The main purpose of establishing these formal control instruments and mechanisms is 
to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the partner(s) and the risk of poor 
performance (Das & Teng 2001; Langfield-Smith & Smith 2003; Van der Meer et al. 
2000). In this sense, formal control -- for example, the use of contracts -- narrows 
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down the scope and the severity of risks in inter-organisational relationships such as  
PPPs (Mellewigt et al 2007). Although the written and formal documents deliver the 
blueprint of how the interaction between the different parties in a PPP will take 
place, in practice certain dynamics can develop (Van Gestel et al 2009). The actual 
steering and control mechanisms used in the PPP can deviate from the formal control 
formulated in formal control carriers. In the previous research on PPPs regarding local 
swimming pool infrastructure, we have seen that the gap between the formal control 
and actual behaviour can be related to the degree of conflict and tension between the 
cooperating partners: the higher the degree of tension, the closer parties hold on to 
the formal control instruments, and vice versa. Therefore, PPP-practitioners often 
apply the metaphor of a marriage contract to PPP-contracts: once it is established one 
hopes it never has to be used.  We will label the control and steering mechanisms and 
instruments used in practice as ‘factual steering and control’. It is not unthinkable 
that over time the factual control (different from formal control) becomes formalised 
in a contract. 
 
1.3 Trust 
A second important concept in this paper is ‘trust’. In what follows, we first will look 
at what the literature has to say about the importance of trust regarding to control. 
Secondly, we will elaborate the trust-concept in order to apply in our case studies. 
 
1.3.1 Exploring trust in relationship with control 
In organisational studies there are two ways to treat trust (Sako 1998): either as a 
determinant of ‘governance structure’ or as a governance structure in itself. In other 
words, trust can be seen as a factor that influences control mechanisms or it can be 
seen as a(n) (informal) control mechanism on its own. In the latter, trust forms a 
trinity with market and hierarchy (Ouchi 1980; Adler 2001). Also we use a similar 
trinity (market, hierarchy, network) to distinguish different types of control.  
We have stated that control instruments in PPPs are used by public actors to 
consciously influence the behaviour of other public and private actors in the PPP to 
achieve the public actors’ goals. By doing so, the public actor can reduce, on the one 
hand, the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the other partner(s) and, on the other 
hand, the risk of poor performance in accomplishing the public actor’s goal. Also trust 
can be seen as a mechanism to reduce complexity and uncertainty. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) define trust as ‘‘a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or behavior of another’’ (p. 395). By having these positive expectations 
in the future behaviour of the partner in a PPP, the internal complexity of the PPP is 
simplified. Trust absorbs complexity insofar as the trustor acts as if the trustee’s 
actions are, at least to some degree, predictable (Luhmann 1989). In this context, 
trust can also be seen as a mechanism for reducing (perceived) risk6. We can conclude 
that trust and control have, in some way, the same function, namely that they both 
reduce uncertainties in cooperative relationships and, therefore, also reduce certain 
                                                     
6 see e.g. Arrow 1973; Fried 1982; Shapiro 1987; Williamson 1985; Zucker 1986; Das & Teng 2001 
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risks that are involved with the cooperation. The question that arises is in what way 
both concepts will interact in an inter-organisational setting, like PPPs.  
The subject of the relationship between trust and formal control has received a lot of 
attention in the literature on inter-organisational relationships. Different theoretical 
perspectives on the significance of the relation between trust and control have 
emerged (Vlaar et al. 2007 p. 408). In particular, contributions have emphasised (a) 
that trust and formalisation may act as substitutes7; (b) that they may function as 
complements8; (c) that they have a variety of performance effects9; and (d) that they 
may develop along self-reinforcing cycles10. In our view, the first perspective -- that 
trust and formal control act as substitutes -- can be put aside, since formal control 
(e.g. a PPP-contract) is essential in a complex environment, such as a PPP. Because of 
the nature of trust, being that it has the ability to reduce uncertainty and, therefore, 
the perceived risk, it may have an influence on how the trustor uses the available 
formal control instruments (HMN). Hence, a possible explanation of the emerging gap 
between formal control and factual control can be attributed to trust. It is not 
unthinkable that, if a PPP is characterised by high mutual trust, partners will waive 
costly monitoring and control mechanisms.  
The paragraph above assumes that trust has an effect on the use of control, but there 
can also be an effect in the opposite direction. We have stated that the presence of 
proper formal control instruments (e.g. contract) may reduce risks and decrease the 
possibility of failure. This reduction of risks through the use of proper control 
instruments can increase the level of trust (Goold and Campbell 1987; Sitkin 1995; 
Coletti et al  2005). However, Schoorman et al (2007, P. 347), stated that there is an 
important caveat to be noted: If there is a very strong system of control in an 
organisation, it will inhibit the development of trust. Not only will there be few 
situations where there is any remaining perceived risk, but trustworthy actions will be 
attributed to the existence of the control system rather than the trustee (cf. 
Strickland, 1958). In some cases, the very mechanisms that were created to reduce 
risk in transaction have the unintended consequence of reducing trust in relationships 
(Molm et al 2000). Therefore, the relation between trust and control can have a very 
ambiguous character during interaction.  
Finally, trust can also play an initial role prior to or during the construction of the 
formal control instruments. Powell (1996), for instance, argued that in the absence of 
“natural” conditions for trust development -- such as familiarity based on past 
experiences or characteristics of similarity -- inter-organisational collaborations tend 
to rely more heavily on formal and institutional base arrangements, which can be 
more costly and time-consuming (Costa & Bijlsma-Frankema 2007 p. 398). The 
presence of initial trust can therefore have an influence on the complexity of the 
contract. PPPs are, at most, long-term partnerships where not every risk that can 
occur during the period can be foreseen. If trust initially is present, it is possible that 
contract-partners choose not to cover a certain risk in the contract, but apply a more 
network-like mechanism to deal with this risk (e.g.  consultation structure procedures 
in case unexpected events occur). Because it is impossible to foresee every 
contingency that may arise in a relationship, and the costs associated with monitoring 
and enforcing contracts may be considerable, exchange partners might instead rely on 
                                                     
7 e.g., Das & Teng, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995 
8 e.g., Deakin & Wilkinson, 1998; K. J. Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Sitkin, 1995; Zucker, 1986 
9 e.g., Kern, 1998; Luo, 2002; K. J. Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Sydow & Windeler, 2003 
10 e.g., Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Inkpen & Curall, 2004; Macaulay, 1963; Zand, 1972 
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trust as a means of managing risk and fostering collaboration (Macaulay, 1963; Sitkin 
and Roth, 1993; Gulati, 1995a; Uzzi, 1996; Jensen, 2003 in Malhotra and lumineau 
forthcoming p.3). In a low trust setting it is plausible that contract partners will try to 
grab for more market-based mechanisms (e.g. pinpointed risk deviation) in an attempt 
to make the contract watertight.  
Anyway, most complex relationships rely on both trust and control simultaneously, 
since neither contracts nor trust can typically provide a complete solution to the 
problems inherent in exchange relationships (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The above 
sketch of the trust-control relation, however, shows that this relation is far from 
clear. With this research, we want to clarify this relationship by testing our conceptual 
framework on real cases in practice.  
 
1.3.2 Developing our trust-concept 
In the previous section of this paper, we briefly discussed the relation between trust 
and control. We already stated that trust can be seen as a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based on the positive expectations of 
the intentions or behaviour of another actor. In this section we will further elaborate 
our notion of the concept “trust”.  
Exploring the role of trust between partners in a PPP is a conceptual challenge 
because trust is inherently an individual-level phenomenon (Zaheer et al 1998). In the 
end, there are individuals who trust, not organisations. Zaheer et al. (1998) uses the 
term interpersonal trust to refer to the trust that an individual boundary-spanning 
agent shows towards her counterpart in the partner organisation. The term inter-
organisational trust is, subsequently, the trust placed in the partner organisation by 
the members of a focal organisation. In an overview on the literature on trust, made 
by Zaheer and Harris (2006), a large number of scholars imply a close relationship 
between the two concepts11. In research on entrepreneur-investors relations, Sapienza 
and Korsgaard (1996) stated that inter-organisational trust is essentially equated with 
trust between the entrepreneurial CEO and the lead investor. Given the similar 
context of PPPs, where the interaction between the partner organisations runs mainly 
through the boundary-spanning managers of the respective organisations, we do not 
explicitly make the distinction between the two analytic levels of trust. 
The review of the trust literature by Mishra (1996) identified four distinct dimensions 
or components of trust. He incorporated these four dimensions in the following 
definition of trust, which is founded on the notions of vulnerability (and expectations 
or beliefs): 
Trust is one party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the belief 
that the latter party is 1) competent, 2) open, 3) concerned, and 4) reliable.( P. 5 ) 
Across the trust literature several typologies of trust were constructed in an attempt 
to capture these different dimensions (e.g. Muthusamy, Sako, Lewicky & Buncker,..). 
Although these typologies differ from each other, they are all based on two broad 
notions (Das and Teng 2001). Nooteboom (1996 p. 7) formulated this dichotomy as 
trust concerning a partner’s ability to perform according to the intentions and 
                                                     
11 E.g. Heide & John 1990; Larson 1992; Moorman, Deshpande & Zaltman 1993; Aulakh et al 1996; Nooteboom, Berger & 
Noorderhaven 1997 
 13 
expectations of a relation (competence trust), or his intentions not to defect willingly 
(behavioural trust). 
 For Das and Teng (2001 p 257), competence trust is based on the various resources 
and capabilities (capital, human resources, physical properties, market power, 
technology, and others) of a firm. These resources and capabilities provide the basis 
for the competence or expertise that is needed in alliances (Das and Teng 2001). When 
it comes to reducing perceived performance risk, competence trust is plainly the 
relevant antecedent. Closely related with competence trust is Mayor, Davis and 
Schoorman’s (1995) conceptualisation of ability as a component of trustworthiness, 
which is seen as an antecedent of overall trust. Ability is the group of skills, 
competencies, and characteristics that are significant to alliance task and allow a 
partner to have some influence within some operational domains. Thus, ability 
highlights the task- and situation-specific nature of the trust (Zand 1972). For Sako 
(1997, P. 3), competence trust requires a shared understanding of professional 
conduct and technical and managerial standards. Questions that can be linked to 
competence trust (Muthusamy and White 2005) are: is the partner capable of 
performing its role in the alliance? Is the partner known to be successful at the things 
he tries to do? Is the partner firm well qualified for the alliance? Has the partner 
formed knowledge about the work that needs to be done in the alliance? How 
confident are you in the partner firm's skills? 
Referring to behavioural trust12, Das and Teng (2001 p 256) use the term goodwill 
trust. For them, goodwill trust is about one’s good faith, good intentions, and 
integrity. It is about whether a firm has a reputation for dealing fairly and caring 
about its firm’s welfare in alliances. Sako (1992) distinguishes two types of trust linked 
with the behaviour of a partner: contractual trust and goodwill trust. Contractual trust 
rests on a shared moral norm of honesty and promise-keeping. It is based on the 
expectation that the other party entirely remunerates the prepared agreements 
(written or unwritten). ‘Goodwill trust’ is then the trust in a mutual, open 
commitment to a relationship, including the expectation not to be taken advantage of. 
Other scholars (Mayer et al. 1995; Muthusamy & White 2005) divide the ‘behavioural 
component’ of trust into an integrity dimension and a benevolence dimension. 
Integrity is defined as (Muthusamy and White 2005, p 421) a trustor’s perception that 
the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable. Perception 
of integrity in a relationship is judged by the consistency of the trustee’s past actions, 
the extent to which the trustee’s actions are congruent with promises made, and 
belief that the trustee has a strong sense of justice. Benevolence (Muthusamy and 
White 2005, p 421) is the perception of a positive orientation of the trustee to the 
trustor (Mayer et al. 1995). Benevolence-based trust is based on the expectation that 
another individual or group will not take excessive advantage of the other party, even 
if the opportunity is available, or will not knowingly hurt the other’s interests 
(Bromiley and Cummings 1992; Mayer et al. 1995). 
We will not apply the distinction between benevolence and integrity or goodwill and 
contractual trust in our case analysis, but we will use these dimensions as the building 
blocks for the ‘behavioural’ component of trust. One reason for this is that the 
differences between these building blocks are too subtle to differentiate with the 
                                                     
12 Note that many researchers view behavioural trust as the manifestation of 
subjective trust. Here behavioural trust is used as a trustor’s believe that a trustee will act fairly, 
predictable and consistent. 
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qualitative method applied in this research. To avoid confusion, we will use the term 
‘character-based trust’ to refer to the second component of our conceptualisation of 
trust (Malhotra and lumineau 2009). Questions that can be linked to ‘character-based 
trust’ are (Muthusamy and White 2005): Is the partner concerned with your welfare? 
Would the partner knowingly do anything to hurt your organisation? Does the partner 
look out for what is important to your organisation in the alliance? Does the partner 
have a strong sense of justice? Is the partner fair in business dealings with you? Does 
the partner stand by his word? Is the partner's behaviour consistent? Do you like the 
partner’s values and ideals? 
To summarise, what ultimately makes someone trustworthy is the perception of one’s 
reliability (being able) (competence-based trust), predictability (being consistent), 
and fairness (being willing) (character-based trust) (Zaheer et al. 1998). 
 
Table 2: Dimensions of trust 
 Competence-
based trust 
Character-based trust  
Das & Teng 2001; Nooteboom 
1996 
Competence 
trust 
Behaviour trust (Goodwill) 
Mayer et al. 1995; Muthusamy 
and White 2005 
Ability Integrity Benevolence 
Mishra 1996 Competence Open, Care, Reliability 
Sako 1997 Competence Goodwill Contractual 
Zaheer et al. 1998 Being able Being willing Being consistent 
 
2. THE CASE STUDY 
The long-term research project builds upon a multiple case design. After the study of 
two local PPP-projects, we now make a jump to a case on the Flemish level. For the 
purpose of this research project, a total of five Flemish cases were selected, all with a 
varying degree of complexity, at different stages of the PPP, and with varying 
performance or of different types. This allows for cross-case comparisons based on key 
variables of the conceptual framework. In this paper, we look at the results of the first 
Flemish – first generation - PPP-project from the series of five: PPP in social housing. 
This case will function as an explorative case. In the first place, we want to test 
whether the conceptual framework is fit to analyse PPP practices. Secondly, we will 
try to formulate some hypotheses regarding the interaction between control and trust 
that can be tested in later research.  
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2.1 Methodology 
Our research questions13 and our process oriented approach forces us to make use of a 
qualitative method. Although quantitative research is often applied to measure trust, 
it is only a reliable instrument for measuring the evolution of trust when it is applied 
to a longitudinal case study. Because of the restrictions of our research project, it is 
not possible to conduct such longitudinal case studies. In-depth interviews can, 
therefore, be seen as a second-best solution for capturing this evolution. Secondly, a 
quantitative research method is not capable of capturing the complex and dynamic 
interaction between trust and control. 
Data for this study was taken from official documents (contracts, calls, …), grey 
material (personal notes, e-mails …), and semi-structured interviews (8) with PPP 
partners (both public and private) and observers. 
 
2.2 Social housing 
2.2.1 Involved actors 
Due to the complexity of the project, we will first introduce the main players in the 
social housing project: 
The Flemish Housing Society (VHM) (Flemish level) 
The Flemish Housing Society (VHM) was until 2006 responsible for social housing, both 
concerning renting, buying and borrowing of social housing units. The VHM  carried out 
its tasks through the local social housing compagnies (LHIs). In this context, the VHM 
was expected to be a key player in the PPP-project. 
Local social housing compagnies (LHIs) (Local level) 
The LHIs were created from municipal initiatives (one or more municipalities) and take 
the form of commercial companies. The shares are mainly supported by (the) initiating 
local government(s), (the) local CPAS(s) (welfare organisms), the Flemish Region, the 
province and possibly by individuals and / or private companies. 
aGI (Devision Subsidized Infrastructure)(Flemish level) 
Before 2006 aGI was a part of the former ministry AZF ( General Affairs and Finance). 
It was/is responsible for the grants rewarded to infrastructure projects with social 
relevance. 
Vmsw (Flemish level) 
In 2006 VHM and aGI were merged together in the context of administrative reforms. 
In the past filled the VHM (besides its other functions) a supportive role towards the 
LHIs. This supportive role was intertwined with a monitoring function. As part of the 
administrative reforms, both features were split apart. The vmsw could thus 
concentrate on its support function. 
Private partner 
The private partner SOWO, was a consortium that was set up especially for the social 
housing project. The consortium consisted a bank and a large contractor. 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 How does trust and control interact within a PPP? 
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2.2.2 Dynamic perspective 
Like we repeatedly have said, we want to analyze PPPs in an dynamic perspective.  In 
what follows we focus on ‘control on’ and ‘trust in’. To understand the relation, it is 
important to know from who trust and/or control comes from and to whom it is 
addressed to. In our case the sender (the trustor and the controller) is the initiating 
public partner. In the beginning of the public-public stage this will be the Flemish 
cabinet (initial conditions). Once the policy decision was taken to go for PPP, the 
sender will be the aGI (after the reform of 2006: vmsw).  The receiver (the trustee 
and the  controlled) will be the on the one hand the other public partners (LHIs) and 
on the other hand the private partner. The two pathways (towards public partners, 
toward private partners) will be discussed separately. Finally, when it is relevant, we 
will mention the trust-level from the LHIs towards the private partner. 
 
2.2.3 Prologue 
For several years, the social housing sector in Flanders has struggled with a chronic 
shortage of social housing units. Besides the traditional programmes, such as the 
Investment Program (IP) and grants for the construction and modernisation of social 
housing (SBR), several alternative financing initiatives were already taken in the past 
to deal with this shortage.  
In the federal state elections in 1999, the Christian-Democrats suffered a historic loss, 
which caused her to lose her political dominance in Flanders. With the start of the 
new purple-green (liberals-socialists-ecologists) Flemish Cabinet in 1999, the concept 
public-private partnership appears for the first time in the coalition agreement, 
initially in regard to investments to address weaknesses in the Flemish transportation 
infrastructure. But pretty soon it was broadened to other policy fields. 
One of those fields was the Social Housing Sector. At that time, no less than 65,000 
families were registered on a waiting list for a local social housing company (LHI) and 
the waiting time had risen to five years. The turnaround of a traditional social housing 
project had an average of six years. By using the PPP technique, the Flemish 
government thought it could halve the duration of the turnaround so they could 
accomplish their objective of constructing 15,000 social houses in one legislature 
(HBVL, 29 mei 2001). 
The above illustrates the context in which the pilot-project for a PPP in social housing 
started. The purpose of the project was to create additional social housing through the 
use of DBFM-contracting. 
 
2.3 Public-public stage 
In the public-public stage we focus on the interaction between the initiating public 
entity and the other public parties in the PPP. 
 
2.3.1  Initial conditions (Trust) 
According to Doz (1996), it is important to consider the circumstances related to the 
initial conditions that are present when a strategic alliance is formed (in Arino et al. 
2001). In this paper, we are also interested in the presence of ex ante trust between 
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the partners in a PPP at the start-up of the project. Within a PPP, most (potential) 
partners already have a priori expectations of the behavioural standards of the other 
party, particularly that it will comply with those standards. Arino et al. (2001) claim 
that the bases for these expectations are found in what Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer 
(1996) describe as “traditional” sources of trust: “familiarity, shared experience, 
reciprocal disclosure, threats and deterrents, fulfilled promises and demonstrations 
of non-exploitation of vulnerability.” These sources of trust all presume a prior 
interaction between partners; though, this is not necessarily always the case. In what 
follows, we will sketch these initial conditions. We are especially interested in the 
level of trust of the initiator of the project, being the cabinet, because it is the level 
of trust of the cabinet towards the other partners that possibly influences the choice 
of control instruments and the way the project will be structured (by the cabinet). 
The Social Housing Sector was traditionally a Christian-Democratic power bastion (De 
Morgen, 6 April 2002), whereas the new minister of Social Housing was from the 
Flemish Liberal Party (VLD), which won the elections of 1999. In this context, PPP was 
seen as a very liberal recipe that caused suspicion and resistance  from the sector. In 
addition, in the same period a Flemish newspaper published a series of articles in 
which some scandals in the Social Housing Sector were exposed. Although the 
president of the Flemish Housing Society (VHM) was not involved, it increased the 
mistrust between the new cabinet and the Social Housing Sector. In March 2002 a 
statement from an anonymous source in the periodical ‘De Morgen’ outlined the 
situation: 
“It’s opposition from the inside. If they want to eliminate the VHM executives, 
we will boycott the PPP-plans” 
The confidence of the cabinet in the goodwill of the sector diminished. Furthermore, 
the cabinet was aware of a certain resistance from local housing societies:  
 “Apart from one was encouraged or not, but in general there was a resistance 
against new issues. In many agencies there is fear for the new and the 
consequences of it on its own organisation. Because if those PPP’s get 
successful, will they need us still?” (the cabinet) 
“They {the local housing societies} want to be builders and decide everything from a 
till z for themselves” (the cabinet) 
We can conclude that the initial conditions in terms of trust between the cabinet and 
the other public partners in the PPP-project are characterised by low character-based 
trust. The cabinet is not confident in the goodwill and cooperative behaviour of the 
other public players in the field. 
 
2.3.2 Control 
Because of their function, the VHM was expected to be a logical partner in the 
project. But in the initiation phase and the structuring phase the VHM initially was 
hardly involved. 
“During the entire start-up of the project we were not considered as a prior partner 
of the cabinet, actually we were not a partner. That the cabinet explicitly had 
chosen to install a structuring model first, above all a financing model and 
afterwards awarded the enactment to aGI (Devision Subsidized Infrastructure) of 
the former ministry AZF ( General Affairs and Finance)” (VHM) 
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In 2001 external consultants were assigned to draft a first PPP-concept. After further 
exploratory work of the administration, a second study was ordered in 2002 to 
elaborate the PPP-concept more concretely. With further explanation of the project, a 
workforce composed of members of the cabinet, the external consultants, and some 
experts from inside the administration was set up. Besides the consultation of a 
number of actors out of the field, the project took shape in a very technocratic 
manner. 
Around the same time as the elaboration of the concept, aGI started searching for 
appropriate locations. Besides some substantive criteria, like spread, rapidity of the 
possible start-up, nature of the area, and length of the waiting lists, the budgetary 
possibilities and goodwill of the local entities on PPP was also looked at.  This resulted 
in 14 locations that were divided into three provincial plots. Once the selection was 
made, the Flemish government organised a road show where the principles of the 
project would be explained to the local entities. 
It was 2003 when the selected local parties were asked to send their demands to aGI 
(still under the department AZF), which acted as the contracting government. 
According to the output-oriented specifications, the local parties were asked to note 
their demands on one A4-sized paper. For a number of local actors this stage of the 
PPP was the only moment their voice was heard. Once this document was transferred, 
no adjustments were possible: 
“It was like: give your program on that one piece of paper. I had forgotten to 
ask for terraces. I had like to have terraces. Now we don’t have them.” (LHI) 
Like we have seen in the previous part, the initial setting of the SH-project was 
characterised by low character-based trust. Additionally, the project itself was the 
first PPP-project of its kind in Flanders, so there was still little knowledge concerning 
the approach of such projects. This project was, therefore, seen as a pilot-project, so 
the public structuring of this project was tightly controlled. The initiating government 
instigated a lot of strict procedures, and there were few moments of participation for 
the local partners. Finally, the decision lines ran top-down, so we can conclude that, 
in the case of Social Housing, the steering and control from the initiating government 
(cabinet + aGI) in the public-public stage was strongly hierarchically oriented. 
 
2.4 Selection stage (Public-private stage) 
A. Towards the public partners 
2.4.1 Trust 
Because of administrative reforms that occurred at the same time as the project, the 
VHM and the aGI merged into ‘vmsw’14. The political tension between the cabinet and 
the sector dropped. The local parties (LHI) were asked to include their auspicious 
feelings toward the project and toward PPP in general. However, this did not remove 
all suspicion of LHI’s: 
                                                     
14
 Note that with the Flemish elections of 2004 the Christian-Democrats took back the leading roll 
in the government. In the initial blueprint of the reforms the VHM disappeared from the plan, 
under the influence of the Christian-Democrats the current structure was drawn up. 
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“The LHI’s, and this is important, didn’t have to pay anything. If we let them alone at 
the negotiation table, then it would have been a free lunch.”(aGI) 
 
2.4.2 Control 
The design of the project and the global draw-up of the output specifications were not 
only tightly held in the hands of the Flemish government, but in the selection stage 
the Flemish government also continued to have a strong grip on the process. The 
projects of the private candidates had to be judged on two parameters: the economics 
of the project and the architectural value.  
“During the negotiations we were asked to judge the designs of the participating 
consortia. There were still two private candidates in the race. Since we had two 
locations in the project we could send two representatives to the jury, but we had 
only one vote.” (LHI) 
The participation of the local parties in the judging commissions seemed to be an 
important network-oriented steering and control instrument. But, if we take a closer 
look, it becomes clear that it was transformed to a more hierarchical instrument. With 
one vote out of ten, the LHI’s were clearly in a minority position. 
“Without any inside knowledge we were asked to come to Brussels for the judgment. 
We had 1,5 hours to look at the plans of the private candidate. That was not 
serious and we wasted our time” (LHI) 
Also, the arbitrary division of the locations was a point of dispute. 
“You were in a minority position. The entire plot had to go to the same private 
candidate, even if you didn’t liked it” (LHI) 
The judgment of the economic part of the proposals was reserved for the aGI (vmsw). 
“Points were given two times, once for the economics and an other for the 
architecture. And in the end it was a ‘fait accompli’: it’s going to be […] that 
private consortium” (LHI) 
 
B. Towards the private partner 
2.4.3 Trust 
In this stage, the public parties did not have prior interaction with the anticipated 
private partner. The level of trust had to be built, starting from the selection stage. 
However, there was a strong conviction that the private sector was a sector whose 
main goal was profit animalisation. This corporate goal is opposite to the goal of the 
public sector, who wants to serve general interest. This incongruence in corporate 
values would impact the use of steering and control instruments. 
 
2.4.4 Control 
The most important carriers of control in this stage are the output specifications and 
the accompanying selection procedures, which were published in the bulletin of public 
procurement.  
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To increase the competence-based trust in the future private partner, the contracting 
government necessitated technical, financial, and economical minimum requirements 
from the private candidates. For the requirements of the project itself, the public 
parties had to meet the legal standards of social housing, which was stipulated in the 
existing common specifications for social housing. However, they also had special 
output-oriented specifications on the material-level, which were designed especially 
for the PPP-project in order for the future private partner to have more innovating 
freedom. 
The public partners had estimated that the private market could build and maintain 
450 houses for a period of 30 years within the provided budget of €25 million. This 
number was based on an assumption that the private market could reduce the building 
cost to 80% of the VHM-norms. To ensure that the private partner would keep to this 
norm, it was written down in the specifications. 
Although there were a lot of private candidates, soon it became clear that the number 
of 450 houses was unrealistic. The vmsw considered that only the negotiation 
procedure could provide an acceptable amount of housing facilities. Therefore, they 
were not prepared to make a lot of concessions. 
We can conclude that the contracting government holds onto a strict and dominant 
position, which is also true of their relationship with the private candidates. When the 
limited tender enquiry (in dutch: ‘beperkte offerteaanvraag’) didn’t appear to bring a 
satisfied proposal,  the vmsw tried to find solace in the negotiating procedure. 
Although this last procedure can be seen as a more network- and market-like 
procedure, it wasn’t possible anymore to fully use its potential.  
 In addition, the private partner wasn’t satisfied with the procedure. Their main 
concern was the rigidity of the framework of the project: 
“They make that juridical framework so rigid out of fear to get rolled. The more rigid 
the framework is, the less open you can be”  
 
2.5 Execution stage 
The execution stage includes both the construction and the exploitation of the social 
housing infrastructures. At the time this study was executed, the project was still in 
its building phase.  The relations between the public and the private partners were 
still young, so it is too early to see the inter-relational dynamics take shape. However, 
by observing the first steps in this long-term relationship, we might discover an early 
pattern. In this stage for each location three main actors were at play: the vmsw, the 
local public entity (LHI), and the private partner. 
 
A. Towards public partners 
2.5.1 Trust 
At the start of the execution stage, the vmsw didn’t have a lot of trust in the local 
entities to comply with the chosen blueprints for the new social houses. 
“It was after the tender procedure that there was slightly less confidence regarding 
to changes. We were a little suspicious and wary”(vmsw) 
 
 21 
2.5.2 Control 
The PPP-contract stipulated that a steering group had to be created for each location, 
whose aim was the realisation and exploitation of the social housing units in mutual 
consideration and close collaboration with the different partners. The goal of those 
steering groups, as stated in the contract, was to structure the deliberation between 
partners and the optimisation of the cooperation. In this steering group the vmsw took 
the role of the dominant actor.  
“To hold the line tight. If we hadn’t done that, half of the houses would not be build 
and the other half would been build at double the price”(vmsw) 
The main reason for the vmsw’s concern was the lack of responsibility of the LHIs. In 
addition, the LHIs were not sufficiently involved in the public-public phase. The latter 
made it necessary for the vmsw to closely monitor the phase in order for the 
implementation to be smooth. 
 
B. Towards the private partner 
2.5.3 Trust 
During the first part of the PPP process, the local entities were not largely involved in 
the development of the project. In the selection stage they had access to the first 
drafts of the building plans, but it was only when the project was concretely enacted 
that they would know what they really would receive. 
“There was anxiety amongst the LHI’s towards the quality of the projects. That is one 
of the reasons why we are detached to the project. Using the classic procedures 
takes time. But if you take a look in Flanders, you will see that the social housing 
is of very high quality. The technical quality is on average much higher in 
comparison with the private sector.”(LHI) 
Unlike the local public actors, the vmsw had confidence in the competence of the 
private partner to make the project a success. After the contractual close, the 
partners were ready to start their 30-year partnership. In the first months of this new 
relationship, the character-based trust towards the private partner didn’t increase. 
The perception of the vmsw toward the private partner was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the vmsw emphasised the good relations with the private partner: 
“They [the private partner] regularly demonstrated their goodwill. If we said: we 
could not afford something, they understood us quite well. The cooperation was 
good”(vmsw) 
On the other hand, the vmsw showed a lower character-based trust: 
“The way they [private sector] handled the contracts was very poor and old 
fashioned. Always trying to do other things. For instance trying to bill for things 
that weren’t included in the specifications. Maybe it was ignorance, if it is not, it 
is even worse”(vmsw) 
 
2.5.4 Control 
In the execution stage, steering and control of the private partner was based on the 
contracts agreed on in the selection stage. The provision of adequate and qualitative 
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social housing facilities was the final performance that had to be delivered by the 
private partner, according to the technical and financial plans on which their selection 
was based in the selection stage. Procedures for supervision and control during the 
building stage and an accompanying penalty system were imposed in the 
specifications. During the exploitation stage, the maintenance section was a 
component in the PPP-contract. The task and responsibility division between public 
and private parties concerning the maintenance were mainly based on the Civil Code 
and was insufficiently defined (KC PPS, first evaluation). A detailed risk division 
concerning maintenance was also missing. 
After the tender procedure, the vmsw wanted to step aside:  
“ we are only the contracting government. After the tender procedure the LHIs have 
to take action personally”  (vmsw) 
When this case study was performed, seven projects were built and the issue of 
maintenance was not resolved. According to the contract, a steering group planned to 
clear out the operational and maintenance part of the project. In the meantime, one 
of the facilities already had a problem with a leaky roof. This made clear that the 
contracts were not well adapted to deal with this situation. There was no specific and 
adequate payment mechanism that foresaw that the necessary pivots – positive and 
negative (KC PPS). There was the possibility to stop payments to the private sector, 
since the unavailability of the facilities was caused by the private partner. But this 
penalty measure was too harsh and wasn’t adapted in the case of minor failures. 
In most cases when the contract does not provide clarification, a solution can be found 
through the building of trust and goodwill on both sides of the table (PPS KC 2007). 
But, in the previous stages of the PPP-project, little investment in trust building was 
made. A reason for the rather low level of trust can be seen in the rigidity of the legal 
framework of the project. The social housing project was one of the first large PPP-
projects on Flemish level and considered a pilot project.  
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Our conclusions can be subdivided in four parts: ‘control in PPPs’, ‘formal vs. factual 
control’, ‘trust’ and ‘control vs. trust’.  
 
Control in PPPs 
In our case-analysis we have tried to link individual control instruments to the 
threefold typology of hierarchy, market, and network (see index). By doing so, we 
have seen that there is a mixed use of hierarchy-, market- and network-based 
mechanisms in actual public-private partnerships. Nevertheless, it is not possible to 
just count the mere presence of certain control instruments in the formal documents 
(e.g. contracts) to determine which mechanism is dominant in a specific PPP. First of 
all, not every control instrument is equal in weight. Some control instruments are 
more frequently used or have a stronger impact on the actual PPP-process, while 
others are formally present but not used in practice (the latter is closely related with 
our distinction between formal and factual control). Secondly, in the early stages of a 
PPP, formal control carriers are not commonly present or still have to be built. 
Therefore, we rely on both formal documents and interviews with key actors to sketch 
a global picture of the use of control mechanisms through the stages of a PPP.  
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In the case of Social Housing, the interpretation of the data is represented in Table 3. 
We can conclude that the dominant control mechanism used by the initiating public 
partner (The Flemish government) towards both the other (local) public partners and 
the private partner was the hierarchical mechanism. Some reasons for the initial 
choice to use more hierarchy-based mechanisms can be found in variables that are out 
of the scope of this paper, but are covered by the conceptual framework of our 
research15.  
 
Formal vs. factual control 
In the conceptual part of this paper, we mentioned our distinction between formal 
control and factual control. The case study of the Social Housing project showed that, 
in the first stages of the PPP (the public-public stages), the control that primarily 
existed was factual control. It was in this phase that formal control largely was 
constructed toward both public (e.g. public cooperation agreements,..) and private 
(e.g. specifications, tender procedure, PPP-contract...). It was only in the last stages 
(selection stage, but mainly the execution stage) that the formal framework was fully 
formed. It was also in the execution stage that the partnership between the partners 
really unfolded. Therefore, we expect that when a difference between formal and 
factual control emerges, it first and foremost will emerge during the execution stage 
of a PPP. With this in mind, we could not make a clear distinction between formal and 
factual control in Table 3. Control of the public partners, then, is mainly based on 
informal steering (factual steering = informal steering), while the control of the 
private partners is mainly based on formal steering. Further research on longer 
ongoing projects is necessary to clarify the concepts of formal and factual steering and 
control. 
Although the execution stage of the social housing project was still young at the time 
of our case study, we did see some deviation from the formal control. The PPP-
contract, for instance, stipulated that at least once a year a “steering-group”(in 
dutch: ‘stuurgroep’) would assemble (for instance to draw up the maintenance 
scheme). Although the first housing units were delivered, no steering-group was held 
until that time. In fact, this formal control instrument wasn’t used. But, most of all, 
deviation between formal and factual control was situated between the LHIs and the 
private partner. In this case, the factual steering and control complemented the 
formal control (or the lack of formal control). 
 
Table 3: Control through the PPP stages 
Towards public partners Towards private partners  
H M N H M N 
Public-pubic stage +++ 0 +    
Selection stage +++ 0 + +++ ++ + 
Execution stage + 0 + ++ ++ (+) 
+++: dominant; ++: important; +: present; O: not present 
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 E.g. The Social Housing project was a pilot project to build up expertise (government capacity). The project was 
politically salient; failure was not an option (political complexity). A lot of actors where involved (multi-actor complexity) 
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Trust 
Because it is difficult to measure trust in retrospective with a quantitative method, we 
chose to use a qualitative method, i.e. in-depth interviews. In order to keep the 
concept of trust tangible for the respondents, we divided trust into two main 
components: character-based and competence-based trust. The level of trust between 
partners can even vary from day to day, and it is impossible to capture these 
fluctuations. Therefore, for each stage of the PPP we reflected on the level of trust 
present in that stage. In addition, we assumed that for each partnership and for every 
stage in a PPP we were able to determine a standard level of trust (in Table 4 
indicated as ‘moderate’). Consequently, we were able to focus on deviation of that 
baseline (‘high trust’ or ‘low trust’). Table 4 represents the results for the social 
housing case. 
 
Table 4: Trust through stages 
Towards public partners Towards private partners  
Competence 
trust 
Character-
based trust 
Competence 
trust 
Character-
based trust 
Public-pubic stage Moderate Low / / 
Selection stage Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Execution stage Moderate Moderate 
(low) 
Moderate Moderate 
(low) 
 
Control vs. trust 
In this paper, we have further elaborated the second part of our conceptual 
framework. The concepts that are of importance here are ‘trust’ and ‘the steering and 
control mix’. The relationship between these concepts is already heavily discussed 
across the literature of inter-organisational relations. The main discussion is whether 
formal control (contracts) and trust are substitutes (Macaulay, 1963; Gulati, 1995) or 
complements (Sitkin, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Recent studies try to combine 
these competing views. Mellewigt et al. (2007), for instance, assign two functions to 
formal contracts, namely contracts deal with control and coordination concerns. In 
their view, high trust weakens the positive relationship between control concerns and 
contractual complexity, and high trust reinforces the positive relationship between 
coordination concerns and contractual complexity. Therefore, trust is simultaneously a 
substitute for contracting (regarding control concerns) as well as a complement of 
contracting (regarding coordination concerns) (Mellewigt et al. 2007 p. 834).  
Malhorta et al. (forthcoming) elaborated on the work of Mellewigt et al. and made the 
distinction between competence-based trust and character-based trust. They found 
that the greater the number of control-oriented provisions in a contract, the lower the 
subsequent level of character-based trust. However, they also found that the greater 
the emphasis on coordination in a contract, the higher the subsequent level of 
competence-based trust, which is consistent with those who perceive a more 
complementary relationship between contracts and trust (Malhotra et al. forthcoming 
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p 37). Lui and Ngo (2004) conducted a survey of 233 architect–contractor partnerships 
in Hong Kong to study the relationship between contractual safeguards and trust. 
Similar to Malhorta et al, they made a distinction between competence trust and a 
more character-based trust, but they observed contractual safeguards in the sole 
perspective of control mechanisms. The survey indicated that goodwill trust and 
control served as substitutes for each other, and had similar effects on satisfaction 
with projects and completion of projects on time. Competence trust, in contrast, 
functioned as a complement for control. 
In our research, we observe the interactions between these concepts in a specific 
setting of inter-organisational relationships, namely PPPs. In our view, formal control 
is based on several control carriers (e.g. public cooperation agreements, 
specifications, PPP-contracts,..) comprised of a mix of control mechanisms (HMN), and 
our concept of trust is split into character-based trust and competence trust. 
In our case, we differentiate between control and trust towards the other public 
partners (especially in the first stages of the PPP) on the one hand, and towards the 
private partner(s) on the other hand. The case study shows that we can not simplify a 
PPP as mere a partnership between a public partner and a private partner. Also 
between different public partners we can speak of an inter-organizational 
cooperation, namely a public-public partnership. 
The initial conditions in the social housing project where characterised by a low level 
of trust in the other public partners. In line with Lui and Ngo (2004) (character-based 
trust and control are substitutes), we can assume that this also can be seen as a 
reason for the tight project structuring (and the dominance of hierarchical 
mechanisms16). This control pattern was extended in the selection stage.  
In the case of competence, trust in the public partners there was normal. The project 
structure foresaw that the Flemish government would take a step back as soon as the 
project started its execution stage. A clear relation between competence trust and 
control is not detected for the social housing case. 
In regard to the private partner, the initial conditions of trust were different. 
Selection criteria related to the competences of the private partner were included in 
the specifications. In this case, the specifications (formal control) create a base for 
competence trust. The private partner in the project stated that the rigid character of 
the project structuring and the bounded space for dialogue created a climate of 
distrust. Some aspects of the project could not be discussed openly. Based on this 
case, we cannot claim that there is a causal effect, but it is clear that the level of 
character-based trust had slightly declined. The start of the execution stage was 
characterised by a business-like and detached approach.  
We, therefore, assume that strong control mechanisms (hierarchy and, to a lesser 
degree, market) create a climate where character-based trust does not grow easily. If 
the trustee acts in a trustworthy manner, this can be seen merely as a response to 
strong control mechanisms. A low level of character-based trust in turn will most likely 
lead to a tight monitoring of the contract (higher cost, less flexibility…). Hence, our 
hypothesis is that low character-based trust and strong control mechanisms reinforce 
                                                     
16
 We assume that hierarchic- and market-based instruments contribute to a strong contract, as we see those instruments 
as hard control mechanisms, while network instruments can be seen as soft control mechanism which contribute to a 
more flexible contract. 
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themselves in a vicious circle. Alternatively, we expect that network mechanisms can 
stimulate a trust-building climate.  
Finally, our stage-approach seems valuable for understanding the interaction between 
control and trust in a PPP, since control instruments, mechanisms, and practices in 
one stage present institutional constraints in the following stage (Van Gestel et al 
2009). But there is more. Firstly, the terms of control and steering of the private 
partner are planted in the public-private stages. Secondly, the two trajectories in our 
case (public-public and public-private) unite in the execution stage. The lack of 
involvement of the LHIs in the social housing project caused a bumpy cooperation 
between the LHIs and the private partner in the execution stage. In this sense, the 
two trajectories (public-public and public-private) cannot be seen apart from each 
other. Finally, we conclude that the execution stage demands special attention. It is 
in this stage that we expect the interaction between trust and control fully unfolds. In 
addition, we also expect to observe differences in formal and factual control. 
 
 
To conclude, it is clear that we are not able to unlock the full potential of the 
conceptual framework (the control-trust relation in particular) in our case study of the 
Social Housing Project, discussed in this paper. We expect that the relevance of the 
components will become more clear in cases where the execution stage has become 
more mature and where an personal interaction pattern has been developed.  
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Index: Control instruments through the PPP stages 
  Selection stage Construction 
stage 
Exploitation 
stage 
Hierarchical instruments  Detailed procedures: e.g. 
process of the submission 
of the implementation 
plans 
Restrictive ruling 
 
 
Supervision: 
Contracting 
Government (Vl. 
Government) 
exercises control and 
supervision on site 
Ex ante approval: e.g. 
building program 
changes, admission to 
start work 
Restrictive rules: E.g. 
Obligations partners 
Ex-ante 
authorization: e.g. 
LHI-private partner: 
transfer to third 
parties only with 
prior consent LHI 
Restrictive rules: 
Vb. prohibition on 
property right 
transfer  
Market instruments  Level of competition 
Explicitly prohibitons: 
e.g. price fixing  
Restricted tender (3 
tenders, bids 7) 
  - Performance 
Standards: output 
oriented 
specifications 
Contractual 
provisions: 
requirements 
promoter, LHI 
 Dispute settlement 
through court or 
arbitration board  
Risk Transfer 
Financial sanctions: 
e.g. penalty for delay 
and tardiness,  
Standards and 
Performance 
monitoring: focus 
output specifications 
Contractual 
provisions: 
requirements 
promoter, LHI 
 Dispute settlement 
through court or 
arbitration board  
Risk Transfer 
Financial sanctions: 
e.g. penalty for 
delay and tardiness, 
Network instruments  Co-decision: Selection 
commission (LHI and 
municipality: 2 votes to 
10) 
(Frequent) contact: 
Steering Committee 
(meets at least once a 
year)  
Co-decision: changes 
with the explicit 
permission of the 3 
partners 
(Frequent) contact: 
Steering Committee 
(meets at least 
once a year)  
Co-decision: 
changes with the 
explicit permission 
of the 3 partners  
Networking and 
relationship 
management: 
Obligation for the 
private partner to 
consult wit the LHIs 
 
 
 
 
